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1 Introduction
Peer effects are believed to influence many social outcomes. Peers may play
a role in a person’s health (Cohen-Cole & Fletcher, 2008), empathy (Boisjoly
et al., 2006), productivity (Falk & Ichino, 2006), entrepreneurship (Lerner &
Malmendier, 2013) and the propensity to engage in criminal activities (Kling
et al., 2005). However, the effect of peers on student achievement is more
ambiguous. In a comprehensive review of the literature, Sacerdote (2014) finds
that although about half the studies estimate modest to large peer effects on
student achievement, another half of the studies do not find any evidence of
peer effects at all.
In this paper, we estimate the effect of high ability peers leaving the class
on achievement, behaviour, and aspirations of children who were left behind.
The conventional approach to measuring peer effects in education is to estimate
a linear-in-means model in which students’ own test scores are regressed on
peers’ average test scores. This approach suffers from three limitations (Man-
ski, 1993). First, students may self-select themselves into peer groups based
on certain unobserved factors (correlated effects). Second, peers may influence
each other simultaneously (reflection problem). Third, it is difficult to distin-
guish between peer effects due to peers’ achievement (endogenous effects) and
peer effects due to peers’ background (contextual peer effects). Given these
limitations, recent literature has followed a range of novel identification strate-
gies. These include the use of exogenous shocks to peer composition such as
hurricanes (Imberman et al., 2012) or the end of race-based busing (Billings
et al., 2014), test-score discontinuities for school admission and increases in ad-
mission numbers (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014; Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; Guyon
et al., 2012), random variation in peer characteristics across classes, schools
and cohorts (Friesen & Krauth, 2011; Hill, 2017; Lavy & Schlosser, 2011), and
experimental evidence based on random assignments of roommates (Sacerdote,
2001; Zimmerman, 2003).
Hungary provides a unique setting to study what happens when the highest
achieving peers (typically one or two) leave the class. We exploit the cherry
picking of the highest achieving students in grade 6 (age 12) from general pri-
mary schools by elite schools. In the 1990s, many elite schools emerged across
Hungary as a response to the centralized system of education under communist
rule. The geographical coverage of elite schools in the immobile Hungarian soci-
ety remained unchanged since 1999, when the establishment of new elite schools
stopped. The historical and geographical variation in elite school availability
creates differences in the likelihood that the highest achieving peers leave the
class. We estimate effects at the class level and instrument the share of students
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who left to an elite school by the distance from students’ home addresses to the
nearest elite school. As students spend most of their learning time in the class-
room, it is natural to expect that a large share of peer effects should arise at the
classroom level (Ammermueller et al., 2009; Fischer, 2017; Gaviria & Raphael,
2001). We also conduct several robustness checks including alternative distance
measures as instruments, sample restrictions, alternative specifications, and an
identification strategy which exploits the natural variation in cohort composi-
tion across time within a given school. Finally, additional bounding exercises
leaving the best students out of classes in which no one left corroborate that
our findings are not mechanical.
The primary contribution of our paper is that we estimate the effect of
high achieving peers leaving the class to an elite school on outcomes of the
children who were left behind. By contrast, earlier literature mainly focused
on the effect of elite schools on those students who left to an elite school (e.g.
Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014; Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; Hoekstra et al., 2018). We
also complement the peer effects literature by focusing on the effect of the
highest achieving students, rather than, for example, negative spillovers caused
by children from troubled families (e.g. Carrell & Hoekstra, 2010; Carrell et al.,
2018). We estimate the impact of the departure of high achieving peers on
student test scores for mathematics and reading using data on eight cohorts
of primary school students, whom we observe in grade 6 (age 12) and grade 8
(age 14) from 2008 until 2017. For a subsample of students, we also observe the
grade point average (GPA), behavioural assessments by teachers, and students’
aspirations for higher education.
Our results suggest that the departure of high achieving peers to an elite
school has a negative effect on the students who are left behind in general
primary education, on average. In particular, we find that an increase of 5
percentage points in the share of students who left (i.e., one additional high
achieving student leaving) leads to a reduction in mathematics test scores by
0.03 standard deviations. We find no effect for reading, on average. Further
disentangling these mean effects, we find that students at the bottom of the
ability distribution benefit in terms of reading test scores, GPA, behavioural
outcomes, and higher education aspirations. Students left behind who are at
the top of the ability distribution and who have a high socio-economic status are
negatively affected. They are the ones most similar to the students who left to
an elite school. Moreover, this negative effect of departing high achieving peers
is higher for girls who are left behind than for boys, irrespective of the outcome
variable. However, the gender of students who left to elite schools does not
seem to matter. We consider several potential explanations behind our results,
including class size, class reshuﬄing, and changes in perceived intelligence.
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The relevance of our results directly relates to the school choice debate. The
effects of top students are at the centre of several policy interventions related
to, among others, ability tracking versus detracking, school segregation versus
school busing, and racial segregation versus affirmative action (Lin, 2010). In
the US, for example, the emergence of charter schools could lead to comparable
cherry picking and the subsequent impact for those left behind in public schools.
2 Background
In the Hungarian education system, compulsory education starts at the age of
six and ends at the age of sixteen. Children enrol in primary education when
they reach school maturity (at the age of six) and continue primary education
for four, six, or eight years. Eight-year primary education was introduced under
communist rule, and is the most widespread type of primary education in all
Central and Eastern Europe. Since 1989, children can also switch to an elite
school after finishing the fourth grade (age 10) or after finishing the sixth grade
(age 12). The introduction of elite schools is also typical for most countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, as a response to the centralized system of educa-
tion, uniformly imposed under communism.1 In the year of their introduction
(1989), only two elite schools were opened. By 1999, 44 percent of the Hun-
garian municipalities included at least one elite school, as depicted in Figure 1.
Historically, the most developed regions (e.g. cities) pushed more for the estab-
lishment of elite schools in the education market. As a result, the geographical
coverage in 1999 strongly relied on socio-economic status, and was hence far
from random. However, as we will show in Section 4 (Table B2), the distance
to elite schools is independent of student test scores in grade 6, before students
start leaving, conditional on controls.
The aim of elite schools is to prepare students for university. They pro-
vide the exact same qualification (e´rettse´gi) as the academic secondary schools
(gimna´zium)2, although they are considered more prestigious - comparable to
grammar schools in the UK, exam schools in the US, or Grandes Ecoles in
France. The central government halted elite school formation in 1999. The
reason for this was the presumed negative effects on social cohesion. Nonethe-
less, although no new elite schools were formed after 1999, the elite schools
already in place were allowed to continue their operations. Today, around 300
elite schools operate throughout Hungary, resulting in over 5,000 students leav-
1A more comprehensive overview of the Hungarian education system and the introduction
of elite schools is available on http://www.cps.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/publications/cps-
working-paper-educational-system-hungary-2010.pdf.
2The two other tracks are a vocational track (szakko¨ze´piskola) and a trade track (sza-
kiskola).
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Figure 1: Adoption of elite schools in Hungary.
1990
1999
2017
Notes: This figure displays elite school adoption over time in Hungary. Dark areas indicate
Hungarian municipalities with at least one elite school. Since the introduction of the first elite
school in 1989 in Budapest, their adoption has exploded between 1990 and 1999, when elite school
establishment was halted. The geographical coverage of elite schools has remained unchanged since
then. This is illustrated in the bottom panel using 2017 data.
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ing their classes every year to enrol in an elite school - around 6 percent of all
primary education students.
Admission to an elite school is mostly based on the successful completion
of a written, centrally issued entrance exam. However, each elite school is also
allowed to impose additional admission criteria, such as oral exams or certain
grades received in the years prior to application. Ultimately, the school principal
decides on the admission of students.3 Although most elite schools are public
(75%) and do not charge tuition fees, elite schools that are privately organized,
as foundation (4%) or church schools (20%) can charge tuition.4
In the Hungarian education system, classes are typically taught by the same
teacher in the first four grades, for all subjects. Thereafter, from grade 5 to
grade 8, teachers specialize in a certain subject and teach this specific course.
However, the same group of teachers teaches the same students during this
period. Once students have departed to an elite school, it is possible, but not
frequent, that the school decides to reshuﬄe classes if there are too few students
left in each class. Nonetheless, we formally test, and reject, whether our results
are driven by class reshuﬄing.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Dataset Construction
Our dataset is constructed by integrating student, class, and school level infor-
mation from the National Assessment of Basic Competencies (NABC) database,
and the geographic location of students and schools from the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences Geography (GEO) database. The NABC covers all students in com-
pulsory education in Hungary.5 It includes standardized test scores for mathe-
matics and reading that follows the model of the OECD Programme for Interna-
tional Student Assessment (PISA). In addition, teacher-graded GPA scores are
collected, as well as behavioural assessments done by the teacher for every stu-
dent on a Likert scale from 1 to 5, where higher scores indicate better behaviour.
Finally, students are asked whether they aspire to enrol in higher education (at
the Bachelor or Master level) after completing compulsory education.6
3The autonomy of schools to select students inhibits us from using a regression discontinuity
design due to missing data on admission criteria.
4The remaining 1% of elite school providers is categorized as ‘other’, and includes for-profit
companies and ‘multi-purpose small area associations’.
5Earlier studies using this dataset include Kertesi & Kezdi (2011) on the Roma/non-Roma
test score gap.
6Given that GPA and behaviour (and higher education aspirations) were teacher- (student-)
reported, the share of missing data is higher than for compulsory centralized tests. We observe
GPA for 64 percent of the sample, behaviour for 74 percent, and aspirations for 77 percent.
We therefore discuss the effects on these alternative outcome variables in Section 5.4, while
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Unlike PISA, which is conducted once every three years, the NABC is con-
ducted annually. Each year, the NABC includes test scores of a cohort of
students at the end of grade 6 (age 12) and just before graduation from primary
school, in grade 8 (age 14). The timing of the first test corresponds to the final
month of grade 6 (May) before students leave to elite schools. Considering these
moments of data collection, we focus our analysis on the effect of students leav-
ing for elite schools after grade 6. In subsequent analyses, therefore, we study
two-year differences in test scores between grade 6 and grade 8. This study uses
data from 2008 to the most recent records in 2016, encompassing the graduating
cohorts in grade 8 of 2010 to 2016.
For each student in grade 6, we obtain a measure of the distance from their
home to the nearest elite school. This data is retrieved from the GEO database
and is available from 2008 to 2016. Volan, the official Hungarian bus company
participated in the establishment of the database. Distance measures were cal-
culated using the routes followed by buses of Volan, and indicate the exact
distance by bus, in meters, from students’ home addresses to the nearest elite
school. In addition, alternative measures such as time in minutes by bus, dis-
tance in meters by car, and time in minutes by car are available. We matched all
distance measures to students in the NABC data. Given that we are interested
in the children who are left behind, we take the mean distance to the closest
elite school of each student’s peers (excluding that student’s distance) at the
class level. Using student addresses in grade 6 and grade 8, we are also able to
assess the mobility of students and households within this two-year period.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics are displayed in Table 1. Our sample includes 536,846 stu-
dents in primary education. We divide this sample into those who leave general
education schools for elite schools after grade 6 (“Leavers”; N=38,240) and those
who are left behind (“Stayers”; N=498,606). In the final column of Table 1, we
display the group-level differences of all the variables.
Elite schools attract exceptionally high achieving students. Students leaving
for elite schools score almost one standard deviation higher than the typical
student left behind in general primary education on the standardized NABC
mathematics and reading tests in grade 6.7 ‘Elite students’ also obtain higher
GPA scores on average, are perceived to behave better, and are more likely to
aspire enrolling in higher studies.
Students who leave general primary education for elite schools are more
focusing our main analysis on student test scores in Section 5.1.
7Table B1 in the Appendix disentangles this comparison for every reference group (class,
school, settlement (ZIP-code), region, and cohort).
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likely to come from families with a higher socio-economic status - proxied by
parental education, employment, and the number of books in the family. Also,
boys are slightly more likely to enrol in elite schools (although boys comprise
52.5 percent of leavers, the corresponding share of girls among the stayers is
49.9 percent).
In grade 6, the average class size is relatively similar for leavers and stayers,
at 23 and 24 students per class, respectively.8 It naturally follows that the
departure of high achieving students results in a decreased class size in grade 8
for those left behind, which may also affect test scores (Fredriksson et al., 2013;
Krueger & Whitmore, 2001). In our dataset, however, the number of leavers
per class is less than or equal to two in almost 83 percent of the classes, and less
than or equal to three in 90 percent of the classes. Hence, this limited class size
effect is unlikely to fully explain the results we present in this paper, although
class size reductions resulting from leaving peers may play a role.
The mobility of students is very low in Hungary, as almost 93 percent of
students do not move between grade 6 and grade 8. The percentage of students
who moved and went to an elite school is only 0.4 percent. Two out of three
movers in our dataset do not switch schools, which also suggests that school
mobility motivated by school choice is very limited in Hungary. The average
distance to the nearest elite school is less than half for leavers compared to stay-
ers, both at the individual and the class level. This difference already hints at
distance being a potential “pull factor” for parents to opt out of general primary
schools, in line with the literature on school choice (e.g. Burgess et al., 2015;
Echenique & Yenmez, 2015; Hastings & Weinstein, 2008), and also consistent
with the low residential mobility in Hungary. Measuring residential mobility
as the share of people who moved to another dwelling within the last five-year
period, Hungary ranks 23rd out of 28 EU countries, at a level of mobility (7.4
percent) well below the EU average (17.8 percent).9 This further supports our
claim that Hungary offers an interesting setting study the effect of high achiev-
ing peers, using distance as an instrument, given the low threat of sorting into
areas with elite schools.
Dividing all Hungarian schools into schools where no students left in a given
year and schools where at least one student left to an elite school, we see that
almost half of students are in schools where the best students are leaving. In
terms of student achievement and socio-economic status, the differences between
schools are less pronounced than the aforementioned differences between stu-
8However, in grade 8, classes in elite schools consisting of leavers are significantly and
substantially larger (30 compared to 21). This can be explained by the fact that elite schools
are commonly organized within secondary schools where classes are larger on average.
9As per Eurostat. See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?code=ilc hcmp05
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Stayers (N=498,606) Leavers (N=38,240)
Mean SD Mean SD Diff
Outcome variables
Test scores
Mathematics grade 6 1490.320 185.507 1646.725 174.262 -156.405
Mathematics grade 8 1604.049 198.106 1747.011 176.631 -142.962
Reading grade 6 1480.045 193.773 1644.262 166.401 -164.217
Reading grade 8 1554.320 197.706 1709.823 162.976 -155.503
GPA
GPA grade 6 4.003 0.733 4.618 0.433 -0.615
GPA grade 8 3.935 0.776 4.230 0.569 -0.294
Behaviour
Score in grade 6 4.120 0.767 4.638 0.509 -0.518
Score in grade 8 4.085 0.808 4.426 0.615 -0.341
Aspirations
Share in grade 6 0.513 0.499 0.913 0.281 -0.399
Share in grade 8 0.512 0.499 0.903 0.296 -0.391
Student characteristics
Gender
Male 0.499 0.500 0.525 0.500 -0.027
Education parents
Father
Primary 0.163 0.369 0.031 0.175 0.131
Secondary 0.544 0.498 0.413 0.492 0.131
Higher 0.150 0.357 0.415 0.493 -0.265
Mother
Primary 0.200 0.400 0.034 0.180 0.167
Secondary 0.482 0.500 0.351 0.477 0.131
Higher 0.196 0.397 0.486 0.500 -0.290
Employment parents
Father 0.667 0.471 0.709 0.454 -0.041
Mother 0.624 0.484 0.726 0.446 -0.102
Books at home
<50 0.273 0.446 0.066 0.248 0.207
>50 & <300 0.358 0.479 0.285 0.451 0.073
>300 0.256 0.437 0.525 0.499 -0.268
Class size
Grade 6 23.116 5.446 24.109 4.878 -0.993
Grade 8 21.281 5.518 30.107 5.251 -8.826
Movement
Student moved (G6-G8) 0.073 0.080 0.087 0.086 -0.014
Distance (km) 16.954 16.082 7.030 9.802 9.923
Mean class distance (km) 16.836 14.943 7.598 8.623 9.237
School characteristics
Schools where no one left
(54.68%)
Schools where someone left
(45.32%)
Mathematics grade 6 1479.887 191.668 1515.765 184.614 -35.877
Reading grade 6 1465.892 199.282 1509.294 191.570 -43.402
GPA grade 6 3.983 0.758 4.090 0.709 -0.107
Behaviour grade 6 4.096 0.786 4.196 0.742 -0.100
Aspirations grade 6 0.471 0.499 0.590 0.492 -0.119
Father Higher Edu 0.122 0.327 0.200 0.400 -0.078
Mother Higher Edu 0.166 0.372 0.250 0.433 -0.085
>300 books 0.223 0.416 0.312 0.463 -0.089
Class size in grade 6 22.194 6.135 23.944 4.641 -1.750
Distance (km) 23.540 15.765 10.597 14.804 12.943
Share of students leaving 0 0 0.100 0.131 -0.100
Notes: All differences (‘Diff’) are significant at the 0.01 level. ‘Stayers’: students left behind
in primary schools. ‘Leavers’: students leaving their classes and schools for an elite school. In
all subsequent analyses, we standardize mathematics and reading test scores to a mean of zero
and unit variance. ‘Schools where no one left’ correspond to schools where in a given cohort no
student left to an elite school. ‘GPA’ is the grade point average, graded by the teacher. ‘Behaviour’
is measured as a Likert scale (1-5), graded by the teacher, with higher scores indicating better
behaviour. ‘Aspirations’ represents a dummy indicating students’ response to the survey question
asking whether he or she aims to enrol in higher education. The latter three outcome variables
are presented for the subsample of students where data was observed, at 64%, 74%, and 77%,
respectively. ‘Distance’ measures the distance to the nearest elite school in kilometres.
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dents. This suggests that, within general primary schools, students leaving for
elite schools are the highest achievers, and leavers are not simply sorting into
general primary schools before grade 6. In schools where at least one student
left, the share of leavers is around 10 percent, or approximately two students
in an average class in grade 6. For students in these schools, the mean distance
to the nearest elite school is significantly lower compared to students in schools
where no one is leaving.
4 Empirical Methodology
We are interested in the causal effect of high achieving peers on students left
behind in general primary education. The share of students who leave for an
elite school might be endogenous to the quality of the school. Higher quality
schools can either send out more students, as they offer better preparation for
elite school entrance exams, or send out fewer students, as parents may prefer to
avoid switching costs when quality improvements are likely to be limited. Fig-
ure 2 displays the smoothed relationship between the class-level distance to an
elite school and the percentage of students leaving a class. This share decreases
with distance, approaching zero as the mean class distance grows higher. As
suggested by this graph, the distance to an elite school is an important deter-
minant of high achieving students’ departure to an elite school. Geographical
variation in historical elite school establishment allows us to construct an instru-
ment for the share of leavers, based on the distance to the nearest elite schools.
We use this distance-induced variation in the share of leavers to estimate the
causal effect on the children who were left behind.
Using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), we estimate the second stage:
Yictr = β0 + δ2SLSPctr +αXictr + ρr + φt + ictr (1)
where Yictr represents the outcome variable in grade 8 of student i in class c,
year t, and region r. Pctr is the percentage of classroom peers enrolled in an elite
school. Xictr includes controls both at the individual and class level (outcome
variable in grade 6, gender, socio-economic indicators, class size in grade 6). ρr
and φt are vectors of regional and cohort fixed effects.
The corresponding first stage equation is:
Pctr = γ0 + γ1Dctr + λXictr + ρr + φt + νictr (2)
Dctr represents our instrument, namely, the public transport distance to the
closest elite school.10 Xictr includes controls as in equation (1).
10Distance is measured as the class mean of the number of meters on the bus route from
a student’s home address (settlement code) to the elite school’s location (settlement code).
Hence, we observe some ‘zero’ distances, as elite schools can be located in a student’s settle-
ment. Our findings are robust to the alternative specification γ1Dctr = θ0D0ctr + θ1Dctr with
10
Figure 2: Percentage of leavers in a class as a function of distance.
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Notes: This figure displays a local polynomial smoothed kernel density plot of the unconditional
relationship between mean class distance to elite schools and the percentage of leavers in a class.
Three points about equations (1) and (2) are worth mentioning. First, we
apply 2SLS using the class mean public transport distance to the closest elite
school as an instrument. In the tables presented in Section 5, all first stage
F-statistics are well above the conventional weak instruments thresholds. Ad-
ditional first stage results are presented in Table B2 for various sets of controls.
Consistent coefficients and F-statistics well above conventional thresholds sug-
gest that the mean class distance to an elite school is a strong instrument for
the share of students leaving for elite schools.
Second, historically, highly developed regions pushed more for the establish-
ment of elite schools in the education market. Therefore, we include region fixed
effects and exploit variation in distance within regions. In addition, we include
a full set of socio-economic controls (parental education, parental employment,
and number of books at home) both at the individual level and at the class level
(calculated as the leave-out-mean).11
Third, it is possible that parents living far away from elite schools move
close to an elite school before they choose to enrol their children. This would
render our instrument invalid. In Table B2 we provide an empirical check of
the assumption that students are not sorting into regions with elite schools. As
θ0D0ctr = 0 when the mean class distance to an elite school is larger than 0. When the mean
distance is 0, Dctr = 0 while D0ctr = 1. Hence, θ0 estimates the effect when the mean class
distance is 0 and θ1 otherwise.
11In Table B3 in the Appendix, we obtain analogous results when repeating our analysis
without cities to rule out bias from elite schools clustering in the most developed regions.
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discussed before, residential mobility in Hungary is extremely low. Given the
rigid educational landscape since 1999 in this immobile society, the distance to
elite schools should be independent of test scores before students leave to elite
schools. Therefore, we regress the class mean distance to elite schools on math-
ematics and reading test scores in grade 6, conditional on individual controls,
class-level controls and fixed effects. The results in Table B2 suggest there is
no significant relationship between grade 6 test scores and the mean distance
to an elite school, consistent with the exclusion restriction of our instrument.12
Repeating the regressions with grade 8 test scores (reduced form), we do find a
significant effect of distance on mathematics test scores. This finding supports
the validity of distance as our instrument and already suggest that there is an
effect of high achieving peers leaving the class.
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
Our main analysis focuses on student test scores of those left behind in general
primary education (N=498,606). Since mathematics and reading test scores are
included as standardized outcome measures, the coefficients of these outcomes
can be interpreted as effect sizes in terms of standard deviations.
Table 2 reports the estimated effect of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools on the mathematics and reading scores of the students left behind. For
both outcomes, we present OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates. The na¨ıve OLS
results indicate that, on average, students left behind perform worse in mathe-
matics and reading when they are in classes where the percentage of peers who
left the class is higher. In terms of magnitude, these negative effects are rather
small: a 5 percentage point increase in the share of students leaving, which
corresponds to one student leaving in an average class, results in a decrease of
0.009 SD and 0.007 SD in mathematics and reading, respectively. As argued
before, these na¨ıve estimates might be prone to endogeneity issues, which could
bias our estimates in both directions.
We next turn to 2SLS results. From our first stage estimates, it is clear that
the mean class distance is a strong predictor of the percentage of students leav-
ing for elite schools, even when a full set of controls is included: an increase of
10 kilometres in the mean class distance coincides with a decrease of more than
1 percentage point in the share of students per class leaving for elite schools.
This negative coefficient corresponds to the negative slope seen in Figure 2. In-
12We also repeat our analysis when restricting the sample to students who did not move
between grade 6 and grade 8, and find equivalent results (see Section 5.2, Table B3).
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strumenting the share of students leaving by the mean class distance indicates
that students left behind perform worse in mathematics when they are in classes
where the percentage of peers who left is higher. In terms of magnitude, a 5
percentage point increase in the share of students who left corresponds to a 0.03
SD reduction in mathematics test scores. In other words, in an average class, the
departure of one high achieving student lowers the mean mathematics test score
of the peers who were left behind by 3 percent of a standard deviation. In con-
trast, we cannot find an overall effect on reading. The discrepancy in coefficients
for mathematics - and the lack thereof for reading test scores - between na¨ıve
OLS estimates and the 2SLS specification could be linked to mathematics being
commonly perceived as a better proxy of ability. Hence, when the selectivity of
elite schools hinges on mathematical abilities, we expect that the students who
leave are particularly the ones with the highest mathematics scores, so larger
effects are expected for mathematics than for reading.
Table 2: Impact of high achieving peers on student achievement
Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Mathematics OLS -0.0018*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0011***
(N=498,606) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
First stage -0.1265*** -0.0976*** -0.1230*** -0.1390*** -0.1534***
(0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0060)
2SLS -0.0057*** -0.0107*** -0.0076*** -0.0045*** -0.0010
(0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Reading OLS -0.0015*** -0.0008*** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006**
(N=498,606) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
First stage -0.1265*** -0.0977*** -0.1231*** -0.1389*** -0.1533***
(0.0045) (0.0034 (0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0060)
2SLS -0.0014 -0.0062*** -0.0035** -0.0001 0.0026**)
(0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Notes: This table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving
for elite schools (one percentage point change), and first stage estimates. We control for individual
(previous test score, gender, maternal education, and books at home) and class level (gender, ma-
ternal education, books at home, and class size in grade 6) characteristics. Class level variables are
obtained by leaving out individual observations (leave-out-mean). We also include regional and co-
hort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the class level. First stage estimates are obtained
using the same set of controls. Corresponding F-statistics are well above conventional thresholds.
F-statistics of corresponding first stage estimates (obtained using the same set of controls) are well
above conventional thresholds.
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5.2 Robustness Checks
Before further disentangling this mean effect by quartile of the ability distri-
bution, we assess its consistency across different robustness checks. First, we
consider the relationship between distance and test scores in Table B2. Condi-
tional on individual and class characteristics, and including region and cohort
fixed effects, we cannot find a significant association between test scores in grade
6 and the class mean distance to the nearest elite school. Also, the first stage
relationship between distance and the share of leavers appears very stable across
specifications. Both findings strengthen our claim that students are not sorting
into regions with elite schools.
Second, we repeat our analysis using different measures of distance in Table
B3 (Panel A). Using the distance by car, or the time of the commute (by car or
bus) between students’ home addresses and the nearest elite school as instru-
ments yields identical results, and all the first stage F-statistics are well above
the conventional weak instruments thresholds.
Third, if students living closer to elite schools exhibit a larger growth po-
tential in addition to higher abilities, selection bias could be driving our results.
Therefore, we re-estimate the main results including second and third degree
polynomials of previous test scores. The results are presented in Table B3
(Panel B). Again, coefficients obtained when (nonlinear) student growth rates
are accounted for are similar to those in Table 2.
Fourth, we restrict our sample to further dismiss parallel explanations behind
our results. We restrict our sample to schools that retained a fixed number of
classes between grade 6 and grade 8. Focusing on this subsample allows us to
rule out the possibility that the observed results are driven by students being
reshuﬄed into new classes. Panel B of Table B3 presents our results. The
coefficients obtained for mathematics and reading test scores are similar in sign
and size to those reported in Table 2, which suggests that the reshuﬄing effect
is not driving our results.
Next, we leave out the capital, Budapest, and other major Hungarian cities
to assess whether our results are driven by elite schools clustered in the most
developed regions. Again, Table B3 reports results that are consistent with our
main findings.
To further back our claim that distance is not endogenous to school choice
in Hungary, we restrict our sample to those classes where no students moved
between grade 6 and grade 8. The estimated impact of high achieving peers
leaving to elite schools is analogous to the estimated effect on the full sample.
We limit the sample by restricting the mean class distance and the share
of leavers to not exceed the mean by more than two standard deviations. This
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corresponds to a maximum distance of 45.9 kilometres, and 27.6 percent of
leavers - or around five students in an average class. We do this to attenuate
the influence of outliers with respect to distance to elite schools and the share
of leavers in a class. Although there is some minor variation in the parameter
estimates for mathematics and reading test scores, our main results are robust
to these additional specifications.
As a last robustness check, we exploit the natural variation in cohort compo-
sition across time within a given school to assess our results under an alternative
identification strategy. This is accomplished by focusing on schools where at
least one student left in every cohort and a series of fixed effects models:
Yist = ψ0 + ψ1Pst +ψ2Xist + φt + ωs + ηst+ υist (3)
Where Pst now measures the share of leavers at the school level and Xist in-
cludes school-level characteristics. φt, ωs, and ηs are cohort fixed effects, school
fixed effects, and school-specific time trends. υist is the error term. Note that
both approaches essentially rely on, and benefit from, the immobile Hungar-
ian society. Distance is conceptually a valid instrument when parents do not
move to send their children to elite schools, while this residential immobility
also strengthens the assumption that between-cohort variation in the share of
leavers is random.13 Our estimates in Table B4 point at the same direction and
are largely similar in size - but, as is common when using IV, estimates appear
somewhat amplified (Bingley & Martinello, 2017). Also note that the heteroge-
neous effects by ability, discussed below, are similar when using between-cohort
variation in the share of leavers (Figure A1 in the Appendix).
5.3 Heterogeneous Effects
Despite this robust mean effect, it might be that heterogeneous effects with
opposite directions result in lower average treatment effects. Therefore, we es-
timate the 2SLS model for various subgroups. Table 2 reports effects for every
quartile of the ability distribution. Quartiles are constructed using the grade
6 mean score on mathematics and reading. As is clear from Table 2, nega-
tive effects are especially pronounced among high achievers left behind (Q1),
while negative effects reduce to zero (mathematics) and even become positive
(reading) for those at the bottom of the ability distribution (Q4). In terms of
magnitude, mathematics test scores for Q1 students reduce by almost 0.05 SD
when one student leaves (around 5 percent) to an elite school, and reading test
scores increase for Q4 students by approximately 0.01 SD for the same class
composition effect.
13In contrast to other studies using between-cohort variation (e.g. Carrell & Hoekstra, 2010),
the balancing test cannot hold in our setting, as the share of leavers is directly related to
student characteristics. Therefore, we chose the IV method as our main empirical strategy.
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Table 3: Heterogeneous treatment effects
Gender Socio-Economic Status (SES)
Mean Boys Girls Low SES High SES
Mathematics -0.0057*** -0.0035** -0.0080*** -0.0047 -0.0074***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0035) (0.0014)
Reading -0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0027** 0.0012 -0.0054***
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0027 (0.0012)
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools (one percentage point change). We control for individual (previous test score, gender,
maternal education, and books at home) and class level (gender, maternal education, books at home,
and class size in grade 6) characteristics. Class level variables are obtained by leaving out individual
observations (leave-out-mean). We also include regional and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the class level. F-statistics of corresponding first stage estimates (obtained using
the same set of controls) are well above conventional thresholds. ‘Mean’ indicates the mean result
presented in Table 2. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 10%
level.
However, comparing classes where no one left to classes where some students
left, biases our estimates downward by default as leaving students (scoring above
average in grade 6, see Table B1) reduce mean scores. Students leaving to elite
schools are high ability by definition, and hence mostly concentrated in the top
quartile (Q1). As a result, departing students decrease the mean Q1 scores
the most, mechanically reducing treatment effects for this subgroup. In Table
B5 we conduct a bounding exercise to take out this mechanical effect. We
do so by focusing on classes where exactly one student left to an elite school.
By dropping the highest ranked student in the control group, we can bound
the effect of the leaving student14 on those left behind, given that not always
the highest ranking students are selected for elite schools - as noted in Section
2, schools have autonomy in the admission procedure, allowing principals to
deviate from NABC rankings. We also repeat the procedure by looking at
classes where exactly two students left to elite schools, and dropping the top
two students in the control group. Comparing bounded and unbounded effects in
Table B5 suggests that our empirical strategy overestimates the negative effects,
yet coefficients remain large and significantly negative. The smaller coefficient
when focusing on classes where two students left suggest that the first leaver
has a larger marginal effect on those left behind in Q1.
Table 3 presents heterogeneous effects by gender and socio-economic status
(SES). We define low SES students as those students whose mothers attained
at most a secondary education degree. High SES students’ mothers attained
14Note that we estimate the effect of one leaving student (not the share) and instrument
it by the mean class distance (leaving one out) to the nearest elite school. This estimate
corresponds to 4.3 (1/23 in the average grade 6 class) times the 1% effect on Q1 students,
reported in Table 2.
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at least a Bachelor’s degree. For both mathematics and reading test scores, it
can be seen that high SES students and girls are negatively affected, with the
effect of one leaving student ranging from 0.01 to 0.03 SD decrease in grade 8
test scores. On the contrary, effects are not different from zero for boys and
low SES students. Also, the gender of those who are leaving the class to elite
schools does not seem to affect the estimated effects (Table B6).
5.4 Alternative Outcomes
For a subsample of students, we also observe GPA scores (64%), behavioural
assessments by teachers (74%), and students’ aspirations for higher education
(77%). Table 4 presents mean effects, and treatment effects by quartile in terms
of ability in grade 6, as in Table 2. Again, we find that mean results hide con-
siderable heterogeneity. Students in Q1 are negatively affected on GPA scores,
behaviour, and higher education aspirations in grade 8 when students are leav-
ing their class to elite schools, while opposite effects are found for Q4 students.
In terms of magnitude, effects are close to 0 for GPA and behaviour, while one
student leaving to elite schools decreases Q1 students’ higher education aspira-
tions by over 2 percentage points (76 percent of Q1 students aspires to enrol in
higher education in grade 6) and increases Q4 students’ aspirations by almost 1
percentage point (29 percent of Q4 students aspires to enrol in higher education
in grade 6).
Table 4: Impact of high achieving peers on alternative outcomes
Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
GPA 0.0004 -0.0020* 0.0019* 0.0018 0.0020*
(N=320,073) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Behaviour 0.0008 -0.0017 0.0003 0.0030** 0.0039***
(N=370,048) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Aspirations -0.0015*** -0.0054*** -0.0013* 0.0004 0.0013**
(N=385,044) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools (one percentage point change). ‘GPA’ is the grade point average, graded by the teacher.
‘Behaviour’ is measured as a Likert scale (1-5), graded by the teacher, with higher scores indicating
better behaviour. ‘Aspirations’ represents a dummy indicating students’ response to the survey
question asking whether he or she aims to enrol in higher education. We control for individual
(previous test score, gender, maternal education, and books at home) and class level (gender, ma-
ternal education, books at home, and class size in grade 6) characteristics. Class level variables are
obtained by leaving out individual observations (leave-out-mean). We also include regional and co-
hort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the class level. F-statistics of corresponding first
stage estimates (obtained using the same set of controls) are well above conventional thresholds.
Main results are robust when restricting the sample to students where alternative outcomes were
observed. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 10% level.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous treatment effects for alternative outcomes
Gender Socio-Economic Status (SES)
Mean Boys Girls Low SES High SES
GPA 0.0004 0.0016* -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0009)
Behaviour 0.0008 0.0038*** -0.0021** 0.0011 -0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0010)
Aspirations -0.0015*** -0.0007 -0.0023*** 0.0001 -0.0030***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0006)
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools (one percentage point change). ‘Mean’ indicates the mean result presented in Table 4. ‘GPA’
is the grade point average, graded by the teacher. ‘Behaviour’ is measured as a Likert scale (1-5),
graded by the teacher, with higher scores indicating better behaviour. ‘Aspirations’ represents a
dummy indicating students’ response to the survey question asking whether he or she aims to enrol
in higher education. We control for individual (previous test score, gender, maternal education, and
books at home) and class level (gender, maternal education, books at home, and class size in grade
6) characteristics. Class level variables are obtained by leaving out individual observations (leave-
out-mean). We also include regional and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
class level. ‘Mean’ indicates the mean result presented in Table 4. F-statistics of corresponding first
stage estimates (obtained using the same set of controls) are well above conventional thresholds.
*** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 10% level.
Table 5 presents heterogeneous effects by gender and socio-economic status
(SES). Consistent with Table 3, we find negative effects that are more pro-
nounced for girls and high SES students, while effects for boys and high SES
students are positive or zero. The magnitude of the effects is close to zero for
GPA and behaviour, while the negative effect on aspirations for girls (high SES
students) amounts to 1 (1.5) percentage point. In grade 6, 58 percent of girls
and 62 percent of high SES students aspire to enrol in higher education. Hence,
considering the minor treatment - only 1 student is leaving - these effects are
rather large.
In sum, our main results hide considerable heterogeneity by students’ prior
ability, gender and socio-economic background. We find that the departure
of high achieving students to elite schools negatively impacts girls, and high
achieving students who are left behind, alongside student from a similar socio-
economic background (high SES) as the students who left. Positive effects are
observed for those left behind at the bottom of the ability distribution.
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6 Discussion
Typically, one or two students leave their class to elite schools. Although the
estimated effects encompass class size changes to some extent, class size is un-
likely to explain the size of the effects. Restricting the number of leavers in
Table B3 did not affect our estimates, which suggests that class size changes are
not the (main) driver of the observed effects. Moreover, estimates considering
only one or two students leaving (Table B5) showed significantly negative and
substantial effects, even after bounding.
Looking at heterogeneous effects, we found that negative effects are con-
centrated among high ability, high SES students and girls left behind. The
latter effect can be linked to previous studies indicating that girls benefit more
from education inputs and interventions in general (Angrist et al., 2009; Katz
et al., 2001), and in particular benefit more from brighter peers (Lavy et al.,
2012). Given the similarity between high SES, high ability students and the
students leaving, it is likely that micro-interactions are at play within subclass-
room groups (Lu & Anderson, 2015). These negative effects might stem from
losing a close peer. Top students left behind, who likely applied as well, might
then be discouraged as their close peers left to an elite school while they did not.
This possible explanation is consistent with the observed drop in higher educa-
tion aspirations, while negative noncognitive effects can also be directly linked
to the observed decreases in mathematics and reading test scores (e.g Borghans
et al., 2008). Since we do not observe who applied to elite schools, and who was
rejected, we cannot empirically disentangle the change in perceived intelligence
and the pure peer effect.
Looking at the other side of the ability distribution, we find that students left
behind generally benefit when top students are leaving their class to elite schools.
The beneficial effects are observed for reading test scores, GPA, behaviour, and
aspirations. No effects are found for mathematics test scores. Again, it is
possible that students’ perceptions of their relative performance are driving the
results. Students leaving to elite schools narrow the ability distribution upon
their departure, creating a smaller ‘pond’, boosting the self-esteem of those left
behind (Elsner & Isphording, 2017; Murphy & Weinhardt, 2018). This positive
effect might be offset for high ability and high SES students by the negative
impact of being rejected, or by losing a close peer. Since it is possible that
sorting on socio-economic background within a class exists during peer group
formation, students from a low socio-economic background may have had less
interaction with the students who left for an elite school, as the latter students
are typically high SES. As a result, the positive effects dominate for low SES
(or low ability) students. Higher perceived intelligence, and self-esteem, among
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students at the bottom of the ability distribution is consistent with the observed
increase in higher education aspirations, and might again translate in positive
effects on test scores - although this positive effect was only found for reading.
An alternative explanation for the improved outcomes of low SES (or low ability)
students left behind is that teachers are now facing classes with lower mean
ability which benefits those at the bottom if teachers teach to the mean.
7 Conclusion
The effect of high achieving peers on student achievement is at the core of many
educational discussions on issues such as ability tracking or school segregation.
We provide novel evidence on this effect by exploiting changes in class composi-
tion due to the departure of high achieving students to elite schools. Our results
suggest that their departure has a negative effect on the students who are left
behind in general primary education, on average. In particular, we find that an
increase of 5 percentage points in the share of students who left (i.e., one addi-
tional high achieving student leaving) leads to a reduction in mathematics test
scores by 0.03 standard deviations. We find no effect for reading, on average.
The overall results hide considerable heterogeneity. We observe that the
mean negative effect is driven by high ability students left behind, by girls,
and by students with a high socio-economic status. By contrast, we find that
students at the bottom of the ability distribution, and students with a low socio-
economic status, are unaffected and even benefit when their smartest peers leave.
For a subsample of students where teacher-graded GPA, behaviour, and higher
education aspirations were observed we obtain similar results. Linking both sets
of results, we contemplate changes in perceived intelligence to be the most likely
mechanism driving our findings.
It should be noted that we did not evaluate the outcomes of the students who
left to an elite school. A potential positive effect experienced by those students
might offset the moderate negative effects presented here. Also, the share of
students leaving for an elite school is rather limited in Hungary, amounting
to 6 percent in an average class. This corresponds to just over one student
on average, far from ability tracking structures often present in secondary of
higher education. Therefore, mean effects estimated in this paper might be
larger in settings where children left behind are facing more severe shocks in
peer composition.
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Appendix A: Figures
Figure A1: Treatment effect of 1% leavers on stayers, by ability in grade 6.
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Notes: This figure displays the interaction between test scores in grade 6 of students left behind in
general primary schools and the impact of high achieving peers leaving to elite schools on grade 8
test scores. Treatment effects reflect the impact of a 1% increase in the share of leavers in a school,
as reported in Table B4, by ability in grade 6. We control for individual (previous test score, gender,
maternal education, and books at home) and school level (gender, maternal education, books at
home, and school size in grade 6) characteristics. School level variables are obtained by leaving
out individual observations (leave-out-mean). Standard errors are clustered at the class level. The
estimated model also includes cohort fixed effects, school fixed effects, and school-specific time
trends. 95% confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the class level.
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Appendix B: Tables
Table B1: Comparison of leavers to reference group
Distribution of leavers (N=26,823) by: -2 SD -1 SD Mean +1 SD +2 SD
Class 98.78 92.23 71.65 36.34 9.65
(relative share) 6.63 20.85 35.74 27.02 9.77
School 99.23 94.52 76.44 39.73 10.39
(relative share) 4.75 18.23 36.99 29.56 10.47
Settlement (ZIP) 99.43 96.26 79.29 39.27 8.07
(relative share) 3.19 17.11 40.22 31.36 8.11
Region 99.93 98.61 87.27 48.95 10.12
(relative share) 1.32 11.35 38.35 38.85 10.13
Cohort 99.97 98.89 88.44 51.91 10.97
(relative share) 1.09 10.45 36.54 40.95 10.97
Notes: All numbers are measured as percentages. They reflect the share of leavers that outperforms
their respective reference group. Outperforming is indicated having a test score for either reading
or mathematics above the cutoff level (columns). For example, 88.44 percent of leavers outperforms
the cohort average test score. This group can be disentangled by students that score above 2 SD
(10.97%), above 1 SD (40.95%) and above the mean - but less than 1 SD - (36.54%).
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Table B3: Additional robustness checks
Panel A: Distance to nearest elite school (class mean)
Time by bus (min) Distance by car (km) Time by car (min)
Mathematics -0.0050*** -0.0051*** -0.0050***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Reading -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0009
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Panel B: Alternative specifications
Growth
Reshuﬄing
(N=462,983)
No cities
(N=243,936)
Mathematics -0.0056*** -0.0059*** -0.0057**
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0028)
Reading -0.0014 -0.0011 0.0002
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0021)
No movers
(N=147,104)
No outliers (distance)
(N=466,945)
No outliers (% leaving)
(N=486,950)
Mathematics -0.0069*** -0.0048*** -0.0065***
(0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0018)
Reading -0.0025 -0.0005 -0.0012
(0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools (one percentage point change), for different distance measures as instrumental variables.
Panel B reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite schools, for
different specifications. The ‘reshuﬄing’ effect is tested by limiting the sample to those schools
that retained a fixed number of classes between grade 6 and grade 8. Student growth (‘Growth’) is
accounted for by including second and third degree polynomials of the previous test score as control
variables. ‘No cities’ restricts the sample to schools located outside of Budapest and other locations
classified as a city. ‘No movers’ restricts the sample to classes where no one moved between grade
6 and grade 8. ‘No outliers (distance)’ and ‘No outliers (% leaving)’ restrict the sample to classes
where the median distance to the nearest elite schools, and the share of leavers to an elite school,
respectively, is less than two standard deviations above the mean. When obtaining all the above
estimates, we control for individual (previous test score, maternal education, and books at home)
and class level (gender, maternal education, books at home, and class size in grade 6) characteristics.
We also include regional and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
F-statistics of corresponding first stage estimates (obtained using the same set of controls) are well
above conventional thresholds. Variation in the number of observations is due to sample selection
procedures described above. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant
at 10% level.
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Table B4: Treatment effects using between-cohort variation
2SLS Cohort variation
(1) (2) (3)
Mathematics -0.0057*** -0.0027*** -0.0017** -0.0012*
(N=124,179) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Reading -0.0014 -0.0028*** -0.0020*** -0.0017**
(N=124,178) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
School-specific time trends Yes
N 124,178 124,178 124,178 124,178
Notes: This table reports estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite schools,
using between-cohort variation in the percentage of peers leaving within a school. We restrict our
sample to schools where at least one student left in every observed cohort within that school. ‘2SLS’
represents the mean effect presented in Table 2. We control for individual (previous test score,
gender, maternal education, and books at home) and school level (gender, maternal education,
books at home, and school size in grade 6) characteristics. School level variables are obtained by
leaving out individual observations (leave-out-mean). Standard errors are clustered at the class
level. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 10% level.
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Table B5: Bounding treatment effects for Q1
Q1 1 leaver 2 leavers
Unbounded Bounded Unbounded Bounded
Mathematics -0.0446*** -0.2220*** -0.1307*** -0.1460*** -0.0517**
(0.0090) (0.0466) (0.0387) (0.0276) (0.0184)
Reading -0.0257*** -0.1093*** -0.0610* -0.0831*** -0.0288*
(0.0073) (0.0373) (0.0317) (0.0222) (0.0157)
N 133,591 107,978 89,173 95,651 58,498
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peer leaving for elite
schools (one student change). ‘Q1’ represents the effect of one student leaving to an elite school on
students scoring in the first quartile in grade 6. The number of leavers in a class is measured in
absolute numbers and is instrumented by the mean class distance (leaving one out) to the nearest
elite school. This estimate corresponds to 4.3 (1/23th of the average grade 6 class size) times the
1% effect on Q1 students, reported in Table 2. Unbounded effects are obtained by restricting the
sample to classes where no one leaves, and classes where exactly one student leaves to an elite school
(‘1 leaver’), or exactly two students are leaving (‘2 leavers’). Bounded estimates are obtained by
dropping the top ranking student (in grade 6 mathematics or reading test scores) in the control
group, or dropping the two top ranking students. We control for individual (previous test score,
gender, maternal education, and books at home) and class level (gender, maternal education, books
at home, and class size in grade 6) characteristics. We also include regional and cohort fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the class level. F-statistics of corresponding first stage estimates
(obtained using the same set of controls) are well above conventional thresholds. Variation in the
number of observations is due to sample selection procedures described above. *** Significant at
1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 10% level.
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Table B6: Heterogeneous treatment effects by gender of leaving students
Boys leaving Girls leaving
Mean Boys Girls Mean Boys Girls
Mathematics -0.0052*** -0.0030** -0.0078*** -0.0064*** -0.0041** -0.0085**
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Reading -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0026** -0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0028**
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012)
GPA 0.0002 0.0013 -0.0008 0.0005 0.0021* -0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Behaviour 0.0007 0.0033*** -0.0020** 0.0008 0.0045*** -0.0022**
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0010)
Aspirations -0.0015*** -0.0006 -0.0022*** -0.0019*** -0.0008 -0.0025***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools (one percentage point change) separately by gender of those leaving general primary educa-
tion. We control for individual (previous test score, maternal education, and books at home) and
class level (gender, maternal education, books at home, and class size in grade 6) characteristics.
We also include regional and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
The percentage of a student’s male or female peers leaving the class is instrumented by boys’ and
girls’ average distance to elite schools, respectively. F-statistics for all corresponding first stage
estimates are well above conventional thresholds. Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
*** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 10% level.
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